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Toward a Fusion of Theological Horizons:
Constructivist Reflections and Responses to
the Question of Theism in the Yoga Sūtra
Graham M. Schweig
Christopher Newport University
IT is important to explore and disclose
how--perhaps even why--we are going to
speak about Christian and Yogic theism
before conducting an exploration on
theism in comparative relation between
the two traditions. In this kind of
discussion, it is inevitable that working
definitions of key terms be provided,
particular terms that will be clarified and
offered to facilitate the discussion. In this
study, I examine and draw from the
particular studies of three scholars in the
field who address the relationship between
Christianity and Yoga in order to illuminate
the dialectical tension between a resistence
toward and the persistence of the
development of a yogic theism. I will argue
that Yoga as explicated in the Yoga Sūtra
possesses a strong and natural theological
character, containing a distinct, openended raw theism that necessitates the
expansion of the domain and definition of
the term.

What must be stated at the outset is
that my discussion here is specifically
theological, but not in the sense that is
commonly understood. This exploration of
theism is speaking not merely from within
a particular tradition for that particular
faith community. Such a person who speaks
theology from within a tradition primarily
for the benefit of the believers is commonly
known as a theologian. But here, this
discussion is conducted as a constructivist
exercise within comparative theology, with
a motive to further an understanding of
shared
theological
moments
and
connections between traditions, and
additionally, to explore the possibility of
some greater disclosure of religious truths
that might bring theology more into the
world of sound intellectual discourse. I
would suggest, then, a distinction be made
between a theologian and a theologist. The
latter, I propose, should point to that
person doing theology not only from
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within a particular tradition but between
traditions or even from outside of any
tradition: he or she would be known as a
theologist. Here the extra-religious realm
of theology is engaged to nourish the
deeper dimensions of specific traditions,
and further, to serve in some small way a
global community that still thirsts for a
vision of world peace and ultimate meaning.
In her study, T. S. Rukmani sets the
stage for understanding ancient Indian
theism. Rukmani asserts that ancient Vedic
and Upanishadic thought expresses how
“everything in the univese” is a form of
Brahman, and that it is “possible to
meditate or be devoted to a concept of the
highest Truth or Īśvara in the Vedic
tradition.” She warns her reader that it
may be difficult for persons coming from
within the abrahamic faiths to understand
ancient India’s form of abstract theism.
Truly, in ancient India there is a fluid
movement
between
an
abstract,
nondescriptive and nonpersonal theism
(often refered to as nirguṇa, or the absolute
“without qualities”) and the less abstract
and more naturalistic, more descriptive
and personal theism (saguṇa, or the
absolute “with qualities”). But here theism
is preoccupied not so much with the
designation of either the one or the other,
or even the identity of the theos. Rather it is
the relationship of the theos to and within
the ultimate reality, or the Brahman, which
encompasses all. Hindu India may frustrate
the philosopher of religion since it is not
strictly a black-and-white distinction. It is
not a question of whether or not Brahman
is theistic or not, because it is certainly
both at the same time. The theistic and
nontheistic attributes are fluid rather than
rigidly static. And though later sectarian
Hindu traditions may argue which one is
“higher,” or which one arises from the
other, or which one is more ultimate,
theologically speaking, to do so may eclipse
or undercut the divine fullness of Brahman
in the process.
Thus Rukmani essentially prepares her
Christian or more generally Western reader
for encountering a theism that is quite
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different than those arising from the
biblical tradition. Abrahamic theisms
consider the identity and personalism of
the theos of paramount importance, a
conception that by comparison to the
Indian theism leans heavily toward a
deistic position. In India, we have the
interplay between the pantheistic, as it
were, and the deistic conceptions, such that
the nondescriptive, nonpersonal and the
descriptive, personal dimensions of the
absolute reality are not only inseparable,
but they are necessarily intertwined. This
kind of vision requires specifically a
theological, and not so much a
philosophical, understanding therefore.
In her study entitled “Vijñānabhikṣu’s
Approach to the Īśvara Concept in
Patañjali’s Yogasūtras,” Rukmani offers the
very well-known statement in the Rig Veda
(which too often is translated imprecisely)
to further describe the unusual and
different character of Indian theism. Her
translation of the passage is as follows:
“Truth is One. It can be described
variously.” She cites this passage to
illustrate how India has “accommodated an
abstract notion of the absolute,” and then
quotes the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad passage
that states “this One is sure not a woman,
nor is this One a man, and this One is
certainly not a eunich. It is protected by
those very bodies whichever It takes up”
(S.U. 5.10).
Then Rukmani, throughout her study,
contrasts
the
more
enthusiastic
interpretations in favor of a yogic theism in
the commentaries of several important
commentators on the Yoga Sūtra with what
she feels is a far more reserved or even
absent theism in the content of Patañjali’s
thought or in the aphorisms themselves.
She goes into some detail how interpreters
of the YS, while leaning toward a greater or
lesser conception of theistic yoga, all of
them are essentially engaged in an
eisegetical reading of the text, claiming
more of a theism in the Yoga Sūtra than
that which is truly there in Patañjali’s
thought. To effectively show this, Rukmani
specifically focuses on the interpretations
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of the word īśvara and the phrase īśvarapraṇidhāna, and the sūtra texts that engage
them, from different commentators, and
then contrasts these with Patañjali’s
employment of them in his text showing
their relatively less important place in
relation to the essential aim of the yogic
process or practice.
Gerald Larson, in his study entitled,
“Yoga’s ‘A-Theistic’-Theism: A New Way of
Thinking about God,” argues that classical
Yoga philosophy, or more specifically,
Patañjali’s conception of God or theism is
unique, unlike anything developed in
Indian or Western thinking on the subject.
Larson seems to be claiming that Indian
forms of theism are equally foreign to
Yoga’s theism as those theisms of the West.
(3) To this statement I would say that the
Yoga notion of God contrasts Western
theological formulations more than Indian
ones. Indeed, Larson himself, in his study,
draws far more from the Indian
philosophers and commentators to
Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra and not from
Western theologians and philosophers to
interpret or understand this peculiar God
formulation. It makes perfect sense that
Larson would draw primarily from the
Indic traditions, since it is out its rich
theological soil that the Yoga conception of
God grows. Indeed, Rukmani herself
constantly dips into the background texts,
such as the Vedas and the Upanishads, to
further illuminate and support her points
in examining commentators’ positions in
relation to Patañjali’s words. Moreover,
Rukmani attests to the theistic leanings in
Vyāsa’s commentary to the Yoga Sūtra, and
especially that of the bhakti interpretations
of Vijñānabhikṣu.
Following Larson’s review of the key
sūtra texts that focus on a theism, texts
1.23-29, he launches into four types of
deconstructive analyses in order to show us
what should not be involved or engaged in
the theism of Yoga. This deconstructive
analysis is the dominant focus of his study.
He claims that Yoga theism must undergo a
process of (1) de-personalization, (2) deanthropomorphization,
(3)
de-
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mythologization,
and
(4)
deconceptualization. I feel that Larson’s
deconstructionistic approach in his paper is
valuable, because it paves the way for a
deeper consideration and view of what
theism truly has been as well as what it
could develop into being, with the greatest
caution
against
imposing
any
preconceptions or prejudices derived from
the conditioned ways we may view the
notion of God as influenced by the powerful
Western and Hindu religious or sectarian
sources.
Larson suggests that “the manner in
which classical Yoga philosophy deals with
the notion of God may offer some
interesting perspectives for re-thinking the
problem of God.” While Larson points out
that Patañjali “accepts some sort of notion
about God,” he first wants to deconstruct
the God of Yoga to pave the way for a solid
re-construction of a genuine theism. Larson
wants this God to be “objectless” and
resorts to conceptions such as “perfect
sattva” and “eternal excellence” and “the
pinnacle of omniscience” from Patañjali’s
thought (YS 1.25). These abstract notions of
God that Larson draws from the Sūtras may
leave us with something that may be, I am
suggesting, somewhat more abstract and
incomplete than what Patañjali himself
offers us in his text. It is interesting that,
for the most part, both Rukmani and Larson
concentrate on texts 1.23-29 to understand
the abstract theism of Yoga, and they do so
with great finesse and solid criticism. But I
believe that Patañjali offers us more, which
I will say more about below.
Andrea
R.
Jain’s
study,
“The
Malleability of Yoga: A Response to
Christian and Hindu Opponents of the
Popularization of Yoga,” in a sense
responds to Larson’s call to re-construct or
perhaps simply to construct anew the Yoga
notion of God. Jain calls our attention to
the many ways, historically, Yoga has
functioned and been applied in the lives of
its practitioners, and this type of diversity
was certainly exemplified by the early
commentators of the Sūtra, as Rukmani
amply shows. After all, is that not what a
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sūtra is for: the teacher’s vision of its
timeless wisdom and the application of its
teachings according to this vision?
Jain brings out the contemporary
problem of conservative Christians in the
West who cannot accept Yoga as something
to be added to their faith, and conservative
Hindus do not accept that Yoga is
something that can be removed from their
faith. Each of them is against the
popularization of Yoga for their own
reasons. Jain goes to some trouble to show
the diversity within Yoga practices as far
back as ancient times, even contrasting the
Yoga of the Bhagavad Gītā and the Yoga of
the Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali. There is no
“unchanging essence” of Yoga, Jain asserts,
and there is now and always has been a
plurality of Yoga.
Jain’s study points us to what has
always been true of religion in general, or
for that matter, for art as well. It is a matter
of context. It is a matter of how and
whether something is framed for it to be
art, or how it is to be seen as meaningful to
persons for it to be religious. It has always
been something so very personal. For
example, because I may see someone in a
restaurant drinking wine and eating bread
does not necessarily mean they are
performing the ritual of the Eucharist! A
more likely place would be the sacred
context or framing, as it were, of a church.
And since such a meal is observed as having
taken place at a restaurant, I can safely
assume that no such ritual was being
performed in that instance.
However, who’s to say that this patron
of the restaurant did not consider that the
wine he was drinking was not the blood of
Christ? And that the bread he was eating
was not the body of Christ? I would have to
ask him or her. And further, do I have a
right to tell this person how he or she must
regard the wine and the bread? Should I be
able to tell this person that he or she has no
right to partake of wine and bread outside
of a church and without priestly ritual?
How Yoga practice is “framed” in the mind
and heart of the practitioner is what counts,
and not others’ assessments or judgments
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of that practice. Invariably, what is
efficacious in Yoga depends upon the
reality of the practitioner’s situation, that
is, the intent, the desire, and the realized
achievement of the practitioner. Whether it
be the convenient physical or health
benefits of Yoga that one is after or the
loftiest depths of meditation that reveal
one’s greatest truth and a vision of ultimate
reality, this is a matter of personal decision
and realization no matter what the social
considerations, pressures or expectations
may be.
The concept of theism in Patañjali’s
Yoga is not only abstract, as has been
emphasized by both Rukmani and Larson,
but it is flexible (no pun intended). Jain’s
study reminds us of Yoga’s inherent
historical elasticity, or its ability to adapt to
different religions, different cultures, at
different times. The Vedas recognized Yoga
practice, the religion of the Upanishads
absorbed it, Buddhism and Jainism and
even Taoism eventually utilized it, and so it
should be no surprise that there are now
Jews, Christians, and even Muslims
engaging Yoga to enhance the practice of
their faiths. And along with this elasticity
of Yoga comes all the objections to its
adaptations by persons within these faiths
who find it inauthentic or wrong for
whatever reason. But the important point I
wish to make here is that Yoga’s theism is
certainly not threatening, nor is it
doctrinally driven such that Yoga would
somehow require one to believe in certain
things in order to authentically take up the
physical practice of Yoga. It is not as if the
tradition of Yoga is endlessly mutable, and
we certainly do speak of change but not
without some sense of the continuity of
tradition. Thus Yoga theism is fluid and
Yoga practice is flexible, and these
characteristics may account for its easy
entrance into various religio-cultural
contexts at different points in history.
Jain’s insistence that there has never
been an “unchanging essence” of Yoga
might be slightly extreme. Is she saying
that there is nothing consistently central to
Yoga practice and thought? Is Yoga so
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elastic and adaptable that Yoga can be
anything anyone wants it to be without
ever acknowledging something at its core?
Is it not a truism almost to the point, in a
sort of buddhistic sense, that nothing has
an essence and everything forever
changes? I question this, because I think
this can be taken too far. In the Bhagavad
Gītā, Krishna states, “by the powerful effect
of time, this yoga was lost . . . in the world”
(BG 4.2). So perhaps there is a point at
which Yoga can lose something of its
essential characteristics, practices, or
something at the core of its traditional
vision, even as flexible and as adaptable as
Yoga has been and still is.
Here, I believe, we might pause for a
moment, and carefully consider the
meaning of the words truth and reality and
the important difference between them. Let
us return to Rukmani’s engagement of her
translation of the statement from the Rig
Veda cited above. The Sanskrit for this
passage is the following: ekaṁ sad viprā
bahudhā vadanti (RV 1.164.46). My
translation, which includes the way in
which each original word is applied, seeks a
theologically
sensitive
and
precise
rendition, as the following: “There is one
(ekam) reality (sat) about which vibrant
persons (viprā) in various ways (bahudhā)
speak (vadanti).” The juxtaposition of “the
one reality” with “the various ways to
speak about it” is itself, I would proffer, a
definition of “truth.” When humans, or
“vibrant persons,” desire to grasp that
which is ungraspable, they paradoxcially
can experience a genuine grasping of the
ungraspable, one reality that is attained in
Yoga, and that very grasping itself is what I
would designate as a person’s “truth.” Thus
supreme reality is one, but the truths that
arise from this grasping of it are many, even
unlimited. And the Yoga Sūtra explains
this: the one who grasps supreme being
(gṛhītṛ), the grasping of supreme being
(grahaṇa), and that which is grasped of
supreme being (grāhya), come together in
the samāpatti (YS 1.41) of samādhi,
illuminating the components involved in
the revelation of truth.
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Because we do not have in English a
noun for the adjective true, it is natural that
we would resort to the word truth to fill
that role. However, in Sanskrit, the word
sat and the word satya are more strictly
translated as “the true” and “the truth”
respectively. The word sat in the
theological context really connotes
ultimate reality, and since the word
grammatically is a present participle of its
root “as”, which is the verb “to be,” the
phrase “supreme being” seems most
appropriate.
The word sat also in the context of the
three auspicious utterances as presented in
the Bhagavad Gītā, oṁ tat sat, also is further
revealing. The juxtaposition of the
utterance tat with the utterance sat
immediately delivers a relationship
between the specificity of being with the
fullness of being, respectively. The fluid
relationship between tat and sat is
expressed and indicated by the inclusion of
the praṇava oṁkāra in this formula. In Indic
traditions, one cannot have the tat without
the sat, and one cannot have the sat without
the tat, and neither is desirable without the
fluid movement between the two as oṁ.
While the abstract theos of the tat would be
stretching the domain of theism to include
it, we need to stretch it even further to
include the sat, because there is not the one
without the other. Moreover, the
dialectical movement between the two,
what I have referred to here as “fluidity” as
it were, must be incorporated in an
understanding of Indian theism.
Let us examine even further the oṁ-tatsat dialectic. The Upanishads in general is
preoccupied with this fluid movement
between the expressions of Brahman as sat,
as the nondescriptive, nonpersonal more
abstract theism in the fullness of supreme
being, and the tat, as the descriptive, more
circumscribed more personal theism in the
fullness and yet specificity of a supreme
being. One of the well-known invocations
for several Upanishads expresses the
fullness of being, in other words Brahman,
in the use of the word pūrṇam: “Fullness is
there (pūrṇam adaḥ). Fullness is here
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(pūrṇam idam). From Fullness (pūrṇāt),
Fullness comes (pūrṇam udacyate). From
Fullness (pūrṇasya), when Fullness is taken
(pūrṇam ādāya), Fullness (pūrṇam), even so,
completely remains (evāvaśiṣyate).” These
invocational words can speak about
Fullness, or Brahman, as being “here” or
“there”. This is expressive of the tat or a
recognition of what is fundamentally a
theistic distinction. However, in presenting
Fullness, the invocation also describes
something from which an endless and
absolute source of discrete Fullnesses are
derivative without diminishing the original
completeness or wholeness of Fullness,
expressive of the sat. When invoking or
speaking of the one, one is also invoking or
speaking of the other, and vice versa, and
thus the inextricable fluidity and
interdependency between the two.
There is a glaring omission in both
Rukmani’s and Larson’s studies that must
be pointed out here. Neither acknowledges
Patañjali’s famous phrase iṣṭa-devatā in the
Yoga Sūtra. Patañjali recognizes the way
the practitioner of Yoga may choose a
beloved divinity as a consequence of deep
study: “From deep study and recitation of
sacred texts to oneself, svādhyāya, one’s
most desired divinity is experienced fully
within Yoga” (svādhyāyād iṣṭa-devatāsamprayogaḥ, YS 2.44). The key phrase here
is iṣṭa-devatā. The word iṣṭa can be
translated as “loved,” “desired,” or
“chosen.” Here, again, we see Yoga’s
elasticity, its flexibility, and its inclusivity.
Patañjali is saying that out of the practive
of svādhyāya, which can include many
practices beyond the deep study of sacred
texts, such as japa meditation, etc., comes
the desire to connect with the divinity, in a
particular form or image of the divine. This
open-endedness is characteristic of Yoga.
This guidance for the practitioner to
focus on a “desired [form of the] divine” is
in sharp contrast to that of the abrahamic
traditions, which have, as a backdrop, the
prohibition against imaging the divine. In
the Decalogue of the Hebrew Bible, we
easily recall the commandment, “You shall
not make for yourself an idol . . . in the
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form of anything . . . for I the Lord your God
am a jealous God . . .” (Exodus 20:4-5, NRSV).
Thus it is unthinkable to create three
dimensional sacred images, artistic images
of any kind, or even ideational images or
forms of the divine. But in India, the
commandment would be quite the
opposite: “You shall make for yourself an
image that you most love and desire, in the
form of anything, for I am your infinite God,
and endless are my forms (ananta-rūpa).”
The word devatā is found only once in
this text, but that it was engaged at all and
how it is engaged is significant. Both
Rukmani and Larson, in their own ways,
insist that the word īśvara is ultimately
synonymous
with
brahman (which,
incidentally, is a term appearing not even
once in the Yoga Sūtra). But here we must
also understand īśvara as having a
relationship with devatā, which is strongly
theistic language. Taking the word devatā
into consideration only strengthens the
picture of theism in the Yoga Sūtra, and
perhaps invites us to probe further into the
text’s more subtle expressions of theism
than what we might expect. Even though I
could imagine how Rukmani, at this point,
might give iṣṭa-devatā less importance
because it appears in the second sādhanapāda intended for the madhyama-yogin
(intermediate practitioner), I would insist
that the appearance of this phrase begs to
be considered for interpreting the critical
phrase īśvara-praṇidhāna, which first
appears in the samādhi-pāda, the portion of
the Yoga Sūtra describing the experience of
the
uttama-yogin
(the
advanced
practitioner).
Furthering an earlier discussion above,
devatā is synonymous with truth. A person’s
truth is what is ultimately loved, revered,
honored, and framed, as it were, as the
highest reality. It is that person’s tat in
relation to the sat. Or put in a simple
equation, sat divided (or “grasped”) by tat
equals that person’s satya or devatā. Such a
vision of devatā must be understood as
īśvara, which we might understand as being
brahman and devatā, both, no doubt a fluid
meaning in the way the term moves
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between the former and the latter. If we
examine the word īśvara etymologically, we
derive a definition of the term that reveals
these two fluid, albeit, components of a
specific type of theism. The word breaks
down as the two separate words, īśa and
vara. The word īśa can mean “governer,”
“ruler,” or “lord,” and the word vara can
mean “environing,” “enclosing,” “space,”
or “circumference.” The latter word can
have many different meanings, but these
are closest to the word’s root means from
vṛ. While the force of the word brahman
leans more toward the state of oneness and
ultimacy, and while devatā leans more
toward a theos, we might understand that
īśvara is the “governer of the circumference
(that constitutes ultimate reality).” The
word implies the components of a geometic
configuration: the circumcenter (īśa) and
the circumference (vara), the former
representing devatā and the latter
representing brahman.
In four of the five total instances in
which the word īśvara appears in the first
two pādas of the Yoga Sūtra (YS 1.23, 24; 2.1,
32, and 45), it is coupled with the word
praṇidhāna, another word that deserves
attention. The word is often translated as
“dedication,” “devotion,” or “submission.”
The Monier-Williams Sanskrit dictionary
provides two better glosses for the word
that, for some reason, is rarely found in
translations of the Yoga Sūtra: “profound
religious meditation” and “abstract
contemplation.” But an etymological, albeit
a rather protracted, definition of the word
spells these out a little further as, “moving
(pra-) deeply (-ni-) into or from the
receptacle or seat (-dhāna) [of the heart].”
The word dhāna relates to what the
Upanishads call “the space within the
heart,” in which the yogin will discover the
divine. The fifth and final appearance of
the word coupled with īśvara is found in YS
2.45: “The perfection of samādhi comes
from the profound religious meditation on
īśvara” (samādhi-siddhir īśvara-praṇidhānāt).
Although profound meditation on the
divine may be found as a practice in one of
the lower limbs of the eight-limbed path,
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namely the fifth practice of niyama, it is
very clear from the samādhi-pāda and from
this last instance of īśvara-praṇidhāna that it
is a practice that is intimately involved at
the highest level or perfection of samādhi,
the goal of all Yoga.
Yoga, then, involves the continuous
uninterrupted movement of consciousness
that reaches deeply into the heart where
the yogin eventually discovers īśvara, who
is the divine puruṣa (who can be equated
with the devatā) and the absolute brahman.
Therefore, as I have been demonstrating,
the openness and fluidity of the Yoga
theism in the Yoga Sūtra allows for Larson’s
deconstructive advaitic nontheism, while it
also accomodates the constructivist theism
that one might expect to see from a bhakti
theology. From my point of view, the Yoga
Sūtra, however, presents more of a solid,
albeit raw theism, far outweighing a purely
abstract, advaitic non-theism.
Let us take Yoga theism even further. A
constructivist view of the Yoga Sūtra could
easily lead one to observe some hint at
what we would call grace coming from the
divine. Rukmani claims that there is no
such divine grace as one would find within
Christian traditions. But I believe that Yoga
has its own form of grace expressed by the
term samāpatti, and as described in the text
in which the term is defined:
When the turning has ceased,
when that which is inborn shines forth
like that of a jewel in the one who
grasps,
in the grasping and in that which
is to be grasped, one stands so near
that one attains a state in which
[a divine] ointment has been absorbed--this is Samāpatti, ‘coalescence’
[of subject and object in meditation].
(YS 1.41)
In this very literal translation, samāpatti
is the “falling into a state or condition”
(Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary) or
what “happens” to the meditating yogin.
The consciousness of the meditator is
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compared to a jewel that is so pure, so
polished that it can shine forth due to its
capacity to catch the light that shines down
upon it. The implied element of light in the
aphorism’s first metaphor of the shining
jewel is reinforced by the explicit and
tangible substance of an ointment that is
put forth in the second metaphor of the
text: that state of consciousness in the
meditator that absorbs the ointment from
the object on which he or she is meditating.
This light, this ointment, which comes from
a divine object in samāpatti, is tantamount
to the grace in Yoga. I don’t think it is any
mistake that one of the most commonly
used words for “grace,” namely anugraha,
or that which “follows the grasping” of
truth, is derived from the same root as
grahītṛ (“the one who grasps”), grahaṇa
(“the grasping”), and grāhya (“that which is
to be grasped”), the three elements that
become united in Yoga when attaining a
state of grace in samāpatti.
It is not within the scope of this study
to conduct a thorough vetting of the subtle
but certainly present, albeit raw, theistic
nuances of the Yoga Sūtra. The task that
faces us when confronted with the
challenge of bringing out any comparative
connections and interreligious similarities
or commonalities in the theisms of both the
Christian and Yoga traditions is a wide
enough definition of theism. If we are going
to ask if there is a theism in the Yoga Sūtra,
if there is a God of Yoga, then it behooves
us to define the term now more
comprehensively and more thoroughly that
may prove to expand and deepen the
domain of theism precisely because we
have a comparative purpose. It is the work
of a theologist, as I have defined its unique
role above, to move such terms into the
comparative arena that casts a wider
theological net, accounting for any data
that would contribute to an understanding
of this category.
A comparative analysis of Christian
theism and the theism of Yoga might utilize
the ten dimensions I outline below. These
ten dimensions are my attempt to give a
comprehensive definition of theism
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because I have found other definitions of
the term inadequate for comparative
purposes. Such definitions were generally
more or less derivative of Greek, Jewish and
Christian theological traditions, producing
too narrow a definition.
The idea of theism is expounded upon
or demonstrated in philosophical discourse,
or religious revelation, or theological
conceptualization, or a personal or shared
understanding, expression, or vision of
“the ultimate reality” that possesses any
combination or all of the following ten
dimensions:
(1) A discrete, unified, perfect and
divine supreme being, the eternal
self-existent primordial entity, who
is often denoted by the word God;
(2) Who is, on some level,
apprehended as distinctly personal,
presented in descriptive or
nondescriptive terms, and who is
perceived as having either the
intimate and affectionate and/or
powerful and grand personified or
nonpersonified unlimited forms;
(3) Who may reveal a singular, dual,
or multiple number of divine
manifestations;
(4) Who may receive gender
attributions of feminine, masculine,
both or neither, androgynous or
neuter designations;
(5) Who is understood as
distinguishable from and yet a part
of the totality of being;
(6) Who has a relationship with the
whole of reality as its source, as its
creator, or as its sustainer;
(7) Who, on some level, also
contains and fully embraces the
totality of being of which such a
divine being is the very center and
foundation;
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(8) Whose relationship to the
totality of being allows such a
divine being to be actively and
continuously present in the world
in various ways, which may include
acts of grace, divine intervensions,
and special epiphanies;
(9) Who may appear to be limited in
appearance when manifesting in an
apparently limited form, who not
only remains the unlimited divine
being,
but
whose
specially
manifested form discloses unique
aspects of supreme unlimited being
for purposes of providentially
guiding human beings because of
pure grace;
(10) And with whom specifically
human beings among all other
beings can connect directly or
indirectly
in
various
ways
according
to
the
naturally
occurring or acquired capacity of
human receptivity to the divine
supreme being.
Perhaps after this attempt to bring out
ten dimensions of it, theism could be
contrasted to related terms or can be found
partially incorporating them, terms such as
pantheism,
deism,
panentheism,
polytheism, monism, atheism, etc. My point
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in presenting these ten dimensions of
theism here is to suggest that this could be
used as a starting point for comparative
analysis of the theism between the two
traditions.
Larson himself says that “God is not
captured by religion. God cannot be
conceptualized by philosophy.” And to this
I respond in agreement while insisting that
there is therefore a special domain for
theology. Larson dramatically ends his
study with Wittgenstein’s words warning
us that ultimately language is limiting and
words are inadequate for describing such
ineffible levels of reality, and that we must
resort to silence, schweigen, the German
word, ironically, from which my last name
is derived. Yet here my attempt has been to
move toward anything but silence! Rather, I
wish to move toward a fusion of theological
horizons, to revise a borrowed phrase from
Hans-Georg Gadamer. I wish to move
toward more ways, more terms, expanded
definitions, greater expressions for the
ways to explore and understand the endless
depths of theism without fear of
committing it to a closed system or
eclipsing its power, without fear of
reductionisms or reifications, in the hopes
that we can discover, first within and then
between religious traditions, some shared
theological moment that will open up even
greater revelations among and between the
thirsting human hearts of this world.
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